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For the most part, trade deficits
or surpluses are merely a reflection
of a country’s international
borrowing or lending profile
over time.…Neither one, by itself,
is a better indicator of long-run
economic growth than the other.
On September 19, 1996, the Washington
Post, Wall Street Journal, and New York Times
reported trade figures released by the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce showing that the monthly
U.S. trade deficit increased by $3.5 billion in July
1996. Almost unanimously, analysts quoted in
the articles stated that the recent trade figures
showed weakness in the U.S. economy. The
news was not earth shattering, nor was the
interpretation of the increasing trade deficit con-
troversial. The conventional wisdom is that the
trade balance reflects a country’s competitive
strength—the lower the trade deficit, the greater
a country’s competitive strength and the higher
its economic growth.
But the conventional wisdom on trade bal-
ances stands in stark contrast to that of the
economics profession in general. Standard eco-
nomic thought typically regards trade deficits as
the inevitable consequence of a country’s pref-
erences regarding saving and the productivity of
its new capital investments. Trade deficits are
not necessarily seen as a cause for concern, nor
are they seen as good predictors of a country’s
future economic growth. For example, large trade
deficits may signal higher rates of economic
growth as countries import capital to expand
productive capacity. However, they also may
reflect a low level of savings and make countries
more vulnerable to external economic shocks,
such as dramatic reversals of capital inflows. Is
the conventional wisdom wrong, or has the
economics profession just failed to keep its
theories well-grounded in fact?
Certainly, anyone can create a theory about
trade deficits and speculate about how they
may, or may not, be related to a nation’s eco-
nomic performance. The paramount question is
not whether one can create a theory, but whether
it is logically consistent and stands up to em-
pirical observation.
The purpose of this article is to answer the
question of whether trade deficits, bilateral as
well as overall, are related to a country’s eco-
nomic performance. We begin by discussing the
origin of popular views on trade deficits and
compare these views with current economic
thought on trade balances. Next, we discuss the
relationship between international capital flows
and trade balances and relate them to economic
growth. We then empirically examine the rela-
tionship between trade deficits and long-run
economic growth.
The evolution of ideas about trade balances
The mercantilists. Much of the current
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intellectual roots to a group of writers in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries called the
mercantilists. The mercantilists advanced the
view that a country’s gain from international
commerce depends on having a “favorable”
trade balance (favorable balance meaning that
exports are greater than imports). The mercan-
tilists were businessmen, and they looked at a
country’s trade balance as analogous to a firm’s
profit and loss statement. The greater are re-
ceipts over outlays (exports over imports), the
more profitable (competitive) is the business
(country). Thus, they argued that a country could
benefit from protectionist policies that encour-
aged exports and discouraged imports. Because
most international transactions during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were paid
for with gold and silver, mercantilists were ad-
vocating a trade surplus so that the country
would accumulate the precious metals and,
according to their arguments, become rich.1
In 1752, David Hume exposed a logical
inconsistency in the mercantilism doctrine
through his explanation of the “specie-flow
mechanism.”2 The specie-flow mechanism refers
to the natural movement of money and goods
under a gold standard or, indeed, any fixed
exchange rate system in which the domestic
money supply is inextricably linked to a reserve
asset. The reserve asset need not be gold.3
Hume argued that an accumulation of gold
from persistent trade surpluses increases the
overall supply of circulating money within the
country, and this would cause inflation. The
increase in overall inflation also would be seen
in an increase in input prices and wages. Hence,
the country with the trade surplus soon would
find its competitive price advantage disappear-
ing as prices rose but the exchange rate re-
mained constant. Automatically, through the
specie-flow mechanism, the country with a trade
surplus would find that its surplus shrank as
its prices rose relative to other countries’ prices.
Any attempt to restore the trade surplus by
raising tariffs or imposing other protectionist
policies would simply result in another round of
cost inflation, leading ultimately to a balance
between exports and imports once again.
Several of the mercantilists—such as Gerard
de Malynes (1601) and Sir Thomas Mun (1664)—
understood the problems of maintaining a per-
petual trade surplus as domestic prices rose but
discounted this problem as a very long-run
phenomenon and emphasized the benefits of
accumulating gold as a means of exchange in a
hostile and uncertain world.4
A few decades after Hume’s original writ-
ings, economists such as Adam Smith and David
Ricardo added further arguments against the
mercantilistic advocacy of trade surpluses. They
argued that what really matters to a country is
its terms of trade—that is, the price it pays for
its imports relative to the price it receives for
its exports. Smith and Ricardo stood the advo-
cacy of trade surpluses on its head when they
showed that a country is better off the more
imports it receives for a given number of exports
and not vice versa. They argued that the mer-
cantilistic analogy between a country’s exports
and a firm’s sales was faulty.
Adam Smith in 1776 argued that money to
an economy is different from money to an indi-
vidual or firm. A business firm’s objective is
to maximize the difference between its imports
of money and its exports of money. Money
“imports” are the sale of goods and money
“exports” are the purchases of labor and other
inputs to production. However, for the economy
as a whole, wealth consists of goods and ser-
vices, not gold. Money, or gold, is useful as a
medium of exchange, but it cannot be worn or
eaten by a country. More money, in the medium
and long run, just results in a higher level of
prices. In the short run, however, Adam Smith
also recognized that under the gold standard, a
country’s supply of gold would enable it to
purchase the goods of other countries.
To some extent, therefore, the argument
between the most able mercantilists and the
classical economists was partly a question of
emphasis—the mercantilists were concentrating
on the fact that in the short run, the accumula-
tion of money is wealth, while the classical
economists were concentrating on the fact that
in the long run, it is only the quantity of goods
and services available that is wealth. However,
the classical economists primarily were respond-
ing to the naive writings of most mercantilists,
who confused the flow of money with the flow
of goods in the short and long run.
National income accounting. Perhaps the
great emphasis placed on national income
accounting today is an important reason the
naive form of mercantilism lives on in the
hearts of many individuals. According to basic
national income accounting, gross domestic
product (GDP) is consumption (C ) plus invest-
ment (I)  plus government spending (G)  plus
exports (X) minus imports (M)—that is,
GDP = C + I + G + X – M.
This makes it appear that exports increase gross
domestic product while imports reduce gross12
domestic product. This is erroneous because the
definition of gross domestic product is just a
tautology, and no conclusion about causality is
possible. For example, it is equally true that the
volume of goods and services available to an
economy (C + I + G) consists of domestic output
(GDP) plus imports minus exports—that is,
C + I + G = GDP + M – X.
Looked at in this way, a trade deficit appears
to be “favorable” because we ultimately are
interested in domestic spending. But this, too,
is definitional. The question of whether defi-
cits improve or hurt the economy cannot be
resolved by such tautological manipulations.
Theory and empirical evidence are required
to evaluate whether deficits are favorable or
unfavorable.
Employment and trade balances. The na-
tional income accounting view often leads
many to associate trade deficits with reductions
in employment. For example, some have argued
that for every million dollars the United States
has in its trade deficit, it costs about thirty-three
American jobs, assuming that the average worker
earns $30,000 a year (that is, $1,000,000/$30,000
= 33.33). So this implies that the July 1996 trade
deficit of $11.7 billion cost around 390,000
jobs.5 This calculation, however, is based on the
fallacious assumption that capital inflows do not
find their way into productive activity. Because
a trade deficit is associated with capital inflows
(to finance the deficit), the jobs lost by the
deficit would be restored by the inflows of
capital in expanding sectors of the economy.
Gould, Ruffin, and Woodbridge (1993) corre-
lated unemployment rates of the twenty-three
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development) countries with their import
penetration ratios (the ratio of imports to GDP)
and their export performance ratios (the ratio of
exports to GDP) over thirty-eight years. They
found that, for about half the countries, the
correlation between import penetration ratios
and unemployment rates (future or present) is
negative (that is, higher imports are related to
lower unemployment).
More importantly, however, they found
that there is no instance of a significant positive
or negative correlation of import penetration
ratios with unemployment rates that is not the
same for export performance ratios. In other
words, exports and imports always had the same
type of correlation with unemployment rates.
Exports and imports are more related to each
other than they are to other macroeconomic
factors like unemployment rates because, ulti-
mately, exports must pay for imports.
International capital movements and the
balance of payments
From a public policy viewpoint, the funda-
mental question is: Do trade deficits reflect a
malfunctioning of the economic system? If they
do, perhaps limiting their size can improve a
country’s future standard of living. What is
known, however, is that trade deficits or sur-
pluses ultimately depend on a country’s prefer-
ences regarding present and future consumption
and the profitability of new capital investments.
In understanding movements in the balance of
trade, it helps to see their connection to move-
ments in the balance of international capital
flows. In a world of international capital mobil-
ity, trade deficits and international capital move-
ments are the result of the same set of economic
circumstances.
As first discussed by J. E. Cairnes (1874),
international capital flows go through certain
natural stages. The capital account balance (or
the trade balance) should be seen as balancing a
country’s propensity to save with a country’s
investment opportunities and its resulting in-
come payments, rather than as negative or
positive indicators. The benefit of international
capital flows and trade imbalances is that, in
ordinary circumstances, they can lead to an effi-
cient allocation of resources around the world.
Net capital importers get their scarce capital
more cheaply, and net capital exporters receive
a higher return on their investments. In turn,
capital imports finance trade deficits and trade
surpluses finance capital exports.
In fact, under the right circumstances, a
country can run a perpetual trade deficit or
surplus. What matters for the balance of trade is
how long a country has been a borrower or
lender in international capital markets. How can
countries maintain a perpetual trade deficit or
surplus? Over time, the longer a country imports
capital, the larger the interest rate payments on
that capital. Eventually, a long-term debtor
country will be borrowing less than its interest
payments on existing debt to other countries
and, in the steady-state, necessarily will have
a trade surplus to pay these interest payments.
A long-term creditor country will be lending
less to other countries than its income receipts
from other countries and will have a perpetual
trade deficit. (For a fuller description of this
mechanism, see the box entitled International
Capital Flows and the Balance of Trade and
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Countries also can be in transition from a
long-term creditor or debtor country to a short-
term creditor or debtor country. The United
States, for example, was a long-term creditor
country throughout the 1970s, with trade deficits
partly or wholly financed by net income pay-
ments from foreigners. However, in the 1980s,
the U.S. trade deficit ballooned as both capital
imports and income payments financed the
deficit. The country was in transition until the
net income account turned negative in 1994.
Today, the United States must be regarded as a
short-term debtor country. Japan, on the other
hand, represents a major short-term creditor
country.
Table 1 shows a snapshot of the 1994
balance of payments for several major countries.
We show the net capital account, the net income
account, and the trade and transfers account
(the sum of net exports of goods and services
and net transfers from the rest of the world).
The current account (not shown) is the sum of
the first and last columns; we separate the two
components to illustrate the forces at work. It is
very difficult to find examples of long-term
creditor countries. The United Kingdom comes
close, with its trade deficit and large net in-
come from foreign investments, but the country
may be entering a transition period. Austria is
another example. There are more examples of
long-term debtor countries, such as Canada and
most of the Scandinavian countries.
Today, the United States has a relatively
small obligation as far as investment income is
concerned. But as we continue to be a debtor
nation, the accumulated debts with the rest of
the world will grow so large that the debt-
service payments become larger than any amount
of fresh capital borrowed by the country. If the
United States continues to borrow, it will be-
come a long-term debtor country. At this point,
we will be in a perpetual balance-of-trade sur-
plus. This must happen in order to pay the
foreigners who own assets in the United States.
Thus, the U.S. trade deficit in the future should
completely turn around.
A key conclusion from this analysis and
an examination of the relationship between capi-
tal flows and economic growth (see the appen-
dix) is that, in the long run, there should be no
link between economic growth and the trade
The trade balance is a reflection of how long a country has been a borrower or lender in international
capital markets. To see this relationship, it is helpful to examine the basic structure of a country’s balance of
payments. Let X = exports, M = imports, T = net gifts or unilateral transfers to foreigners, ∆B = net new
borrowing from abroad, B = net indebtedness to the rest of the world, and r = the rate of interest on foreign
indebtedness. A country’s balance of payments must be
X + ∆B = T + M + rB.
The left-hand side of the equation refers to receipts from foreigners; the right-hand side refers to
payments to foreigners. These must always balance. If ∆B > 0, a country is borrowing; if B > 0, a country is a
net debtor. If ∆B < 0, a country is lending, and if B < 0, a country is a net creditor. A country is considered to
be a relatively short-term borrowing nation when its net indebtedness, B, is small compared with its net new
borrowing, ∆B. In this case, imports will be greater than exports (M > X). A country is considered to be a
relatively long-term borrowing nation when the interest it pays on foreign indebtedness, rB, is larger than its net
new borrowing from abroad, ∆B. Here, exports are greater than imports (X > M). The opposite is true for a
short-term or long-term creditor country.
International Capital Flows and the Balance of Trade
Table 1
The Balance of Trade and Net Capital and Income Accounts, 1994
(Millions of U.S. dollars)
Trade and Capital Income
Country transfers account account
Australia $ –5,604 $ 15,860 $ –11,876
Austria –630 –1,822 2,804
Belgium–Luxembourg 8,167 –10,452 4,853
Brazil 7,938 7,965 –9,091
Canada 3,754 8,331 –21,242
Chile 1,016 4,541 –1,773
Denmark 7,980 –5,537 –5,320
Finland 5,294 4,286 –4,226
France 19,051 –5,015 –10,962
Germany –28,584 24,501 4,704
Japan 88,910 –86,190 40,330
Korea –2,301 10,610 –1,554
Mexico –17,039 12,754 –11,754
Netherlands 11,826 –6,485 1,546
Norway 5,413 –1,321 –1,769
Spain 1,496 4,449 –7,923
Sweden 6,690 6,390 –5,874
Switzerland 9,949 16,469 8,545
United Kingdom –18,520 –24,562 16,129
United States –140,440 120,806 –10,494
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics—capital account, line 78bjd; income account, line
78agd + line 78ahd; balance of trade and net transfers, line 78afd + line 78ajd + line
78akd.14
balance. The long-run trade balance is jointly
determined with the net creditor or debtor status
of the country, while the long-run growth rate is
determined by the growth rate of the population
and technological progress. The next section is
devoted to the empirical relationship between
economic growth rates and trade imbalances,
after controlling for other factors determining
the rate of growth.
Are trade balances related to long-run
economic growth?
Although the theoretical exposition above
concludes that trade balances should not be
related to long-run economic growth, the rele-
vance of that theory has yet to be empirically
examined. Moreover, there are other possible
elements of trade balances, not discussed above,
that may have implications for long-run eco-
nomic growth. For example, large trade deficits
imply large inflows of international capital. But
international capital inflows may be subject to
dramatic reversals, due to external shocks to a
country’s export sector and changes in foreign
sentiment. In such cases, large trade deficits may
be seen as an indicator of a country’s vulnerabil-
ity to external shocks. If large inflows of capital
and trade deficits make a country more vulner-
able to external economic shocks, long-run eco-
nomic growth may be hampered.
While several studies have found that freer
international trade (exports and imports) is an
important determinant of cross-country growth
rates, trade balances (the difference between
exports and imports) have yet to be explored.
This section examines the question of whether
overall and bilateral trade balances are related to
long-run rates of economic growth.
Overall trade balances. Empirically, one can
imagine circumstances in which the trade bal-
ance is correlated to a nation’s rate of economic
growth, even though it may not cause it. Sup-
pose, for example, that a nation is moving from
a relatively closed economy to integration with
the world economy—perhaps East Germany
after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. A country just
opening up to world markets, like East Ger-
many, would have a relatively high potential for
future growth and would likely experience net
capital inflows. But large capital inflows would
be associated with large trade deficits. Conse-
quently, there would appear to be a positive
relationship between trade deficits and higher
rates of economic growth. The higher rates of
economic growth, however, are not caused by
the larger trade deficits but by the opening up of
domestic markets.
In contrast, trade deficits may be nega-
tively related to economic growth if they reflect
impediments to the market mechanism. Here
again, however, the trade deficit itself is not
causing lower growth but is itself determined
by another factor that affects growth and the
trade deficit. For example, it has been shown
that the share of government consumption in
GDP is negatively correlated to economic growth
across countries (Barro 1991, and Levine and
Renelt 1992). If a large share of government
consumption tends to stimulate the demand for
imports, generates a trade deficit, and reduces
growth, this would show up as a negative corre-
lation between trade deficits and economic
growth, even though there is no causal relation-
ship between the two. What is really decreasing
growth is the large share of government con-
sumption in total GDP, not the trade deficit.
Bilateral trade balances. While a country’s
overall trade may be balanced, a country may
have bilateral deficits with many of its trading
partners. Consequently, the relationship between
overall trade balances and economic growth
(discussed earlier) should not necessarily be the
same as that between bilateral trade balances
and economic growth. Nonetheless, we exam-
ine the empirical relationship between bilateral
trade balances and economic growth because
much popular attention has focused on this
aspect of our trade account. To do the analysis,
we develop a summary measure of bilateral
trade balances that indicates the degree to
which a country’s bilateral trade flows are
imbalanced (that is, bilateral exports and im-
ports are unequal).
As is the case with overall trade imbal-
ances, there is no theoretical reason bilateral
trade imbalances should be related to economic
growth. It is likely that countries that specialize
in primary products will have higher bilateral
imbalances than countries that specialize in manu-
factured goods. The reason is that a primary
product producer cannot sell much to another
country that produces the same primary prod-
uct. On the other hand, a country that exports
manufactured goods can easily sell manufac-
tured goods to another country that exports
manufactured goods because of the diversity of
manufactured goods and intraindustry trade.
In fact, the correlation between our mea-
sure of bilateral imbalances (see note 12) and
per capita real GDP is –0.62. This may be ex-
plained by the fact that countries with lower per
capita GDPs tend to export fewer manufactured
goods. Moreover, if protectionism rises with
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may be negatively related to economic growth.
For example, U.S. protectionism against Japa-
nese products may rise as the U.S. bilateral trade
deficit with Japan increases. Because several
studies on the determinants of economic growth
have found that protectionism tends to decrease
long-run growth rates, there may be a negative
correlation between bilateral imbalances and
economic growth.6 The next section attempts
to empirically determine whether there is any
relationship between overall and bilateral trade
balances and economic growth when taking
into consideration the underlying fundamental
determinants of economic growth.
Trade balances and economic growth
The benchmark model. Before examining
the role of trade balances in economic growth,
we first present the results of a basic benchmark
growth model. The model utilizes a formulation
that is common to many of the recent cross-
country empirical examinations of growth and
attempts to control for the underlying determi-
nants of long-run economic growth.7 Equation 1
of Table 2 presents the estimation results of the
benchmark model.8 The dependent variable is
the average annual real per capita GDP growth
rate between 1960 and 1989,9 and the explana-
tory variables are (1) the log of real GDP per
capita in 1960, ln(Y60); (2) physical capital
savings, which is the log of the share of in-
vestment in gross domestic product, ln(I/Y);
and (3) a proxy for human capital savings—
the log of secondary-school enrollment rates in
1960–89, ln(School).
The results of the benchmark model are
consistent with most recent growth studies. Real
GDP per capita in 1960 is negative and highly
significant, suggesting income convergence con-
ditional on human capital.10 Physical capital sav-
ings and the proxy for human capital savings,
ln(I/Y) and ln(School), are positive and signifi-
cant at the 1-percent level, consistent with the
empirical findings of Levine and Renelt (1992).
Equation 2 of Table 2 examines the role
of capital controls, as proxied by black market
Table 2
The Role of Trade Balances in Growth
Dependent variable: average yearly real GDP per capita growth, 1960–89
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 15.327 15.653 15.187 15.17 14.279
(3.602) (4.236) (2.902) (3.336) (3.818)
ln(Y60) –.837 –.933 –.801 –.863 –.943
(–3.852) (4.354) (–3.546) (–3.636) (–4.404)
ln(I/Y ) 3.251 2.970 3.048 2.963 3.149
(8.521) (7.634) (7.897) (7.486) (7.651)
ln(School ) .904 .922 .850 .893 .843
(6.651) (6.973) (6.185) (6.447) (5.607)
Exchange controls –.005 –.004 –.005 –.005
(–2.495) (–1.956) (–2.231) (–2.414)
Share of all years .007
in deficit (1.657)
Trade deficit as a –.004
share of trade (–.703)
Bilateral imbalance –.895
as a share of trade (–.601)
R
–2 .684 .681 .664 .679 .663
RMSE 1.092 1.061 1.081 1.064 1.092
Observations 91 91 91 91 91
NOTES: t values are in parentheses. Real per capita growth is the least squares estimate; Y60 is real per capita GDP in 1960;
I/Y is investment as a share of GDP, 1960–89; School is secondary-school enrollment rates, 1960–89; exchange
controls is the black market premium.
SOURCES OF PRIMARY DATA: Real per capita growth and Y60, Summers and Heston (1991) Penn World Tables, version
5.6; I/Y, World Bank National Accounts; School, Barro (1991); exchange controls, Levine and
Renelt (1992); trade deficit as a share of total trade, bilateral imbalance as a share of
total trade, and share of all years in deficit, authors’ calculations based on data from the
International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.16
SOURCES OF PRIMARY DATA: Same as Table 2.
Table 3
Trade balances and growth
Bilateral
Trade deficit trade imbalance Share of
as a share as a share all years
Country Growth of trade of trade in deficit
Angola –2.7 –20.7 43.5 25.0
Chad –2.4 28.9 49.0 89.3
Mozambique –2.0 39.4 42.8 100.0
Madagascar –1.8 10.2 35.5 81.8
Zambia –1.4 –11.1 52.3 21.4
Central African
Republic –.5 –2.5 41.2 46.9
Ghana –.5 6.3 37.2 72.7
Liberia –.5 –15.5 39.3 4.5
Niger –.4 4.5 37.6 86.7
Benin –.2 55.3 39.8 100.0
Senegal –.2 23.3 34.8 96.9
Uganda –.2 –5.1 52.0 24.2
Guyana 0 2.8 33.2 55.2
Sierra Leone 0 11.6 47.5 68.8
Mauritania .1 –12.1 55.8 12.5
Sudan .1 34.4 44.9 90.9
Zaire .2 –16.4 39.1 7.7
Somalia .2 39.4 63.0 93.1
Bangladesh .2 41.0 47.6 95.2
Haiti .3 34.3 30.9 76.7
Mali .3 36.9 47.7 96.8
Uruguay .6 1.6 39.6 45.5
Nigeria .7 –16.5 42.7 21.9
India .8 18.0 31.1 93.9
Ethiopia .8 24.0 47.8 96.3
Papua
New Guinea .8 –4.8 45.3 48.3
Average –.3 12.2 43.4 63.7
Nepal .9 45.4 48.1 100.0
Bolivia 1.0 –5.6 41.0 30.3
Chile 1.0 –5.8 33.0 27.3
Sri Lanka 1.1 16.8 40.0 90.9
Nicaragua 1.1 24.0 36.6 90.3
Argentina 1.1 –15.0 40.1 22.6
Malawi 1.3 17.5 44.3 96.6
El Salvador 1.3 14.1 29.7 78.8
Honduras 1.3 6.9 29.4 90.9
Guatemala 1.5 10.8 27.4 78.8
Burkina Faso 1.6 53.9 43.7 97.0
Kenya 1.6 24.7 43.1 100.0
Zimbabwe 1.6 –1.0 31.3 40.0
South Africa 1.6 –14.5 39.8 21.2
Peru 1.7 –10.7 27.3 15.2
Mauritius 1.7 6.5 60.0 66.7
Burundi 1.7 19.7 56.7 87.5
New Zealand 1.8 .7 25.3 54.5
Togo 1.8 30.8 42.3 90.9
Jamaica 1.9 20.4 34.5 100.0
Pakistan 1.9 24.1 35.9 97.0
United States 1.9 12.5 19.8 69.7
Rwanda 2.0 30.2 50.0 89.7
United Kingdom 2.2 7.3 16.8 100.0
Switzerland 2.2 4.7 22.6 93.9
Venezuela 2.2 –21.2 34.8 12.1
Average 1.6 11.4 36.7 70.8
Bilateral
Trade deficit trade imbalance Share of
as a share as a share all years
Country Growth of trade of trade in deficit
Tanzania 2.3 27.7 36.0 69.0
Colombia 2.3 1.9 24.9 57.6
Paraguay 2.3 13.4 38.1 66.7
Philippines 2.3 15.1 26.8 93.9
Australia 2.3 –.8 33.6 42.4
Canada 2.4 –4.5 13.5 6.1
Costa Rica 2.5 11.9 30.0 100.0
Dominican
Republic 2.5 23.7 39.9 54.5
Iraq 2.5 –8.9 52.0 50.0
Sweden 2.6 –2.5 19.5 54.5
Mexico 2.6 0 18.2 75.8
Ireland 2.7 –.3 21.6 75.8
Morocco 2.8 24.4 27.7 100.0
Ecuador 2.8 –9.2 35.3 39.4
Gambia 2.9 25.0 52.6 64.3
Turkey 2.9 24.1 25.3 100.0
Denmark 2.9 2.5 18.6 81.8
Netherlands 3.0 –.2 20.0 63.6
Iran 3.1 2.3 42.8 60.0
Barbados 3.1 39.7 37.3 100.0
Jordan 3.1 54.6 53.8 100.0
Suriname 3.3 2.1 39.9 58.6
Trinidad and
Tobago 3.3 –8.0 49.2 46.9
Tunisia 3.3 22.8 30.2 100.0
Average 2.7 11.9 32.8 68.9
Germany, West 3.4 –7.3 15.7 0
France 3.4 3.5 17.5 93.9
Norway 3.4 –2.8 27.6 69.7
Panama 3.5 60.6 46.8 100.0
Congo 3.5 –18.3 57.1 48.5
Cameroon 3.6 2.3 36.7 54.5
Thailand 3.6 12.5 34.6 100.0
Israel 3.6 24.3 30.7 100.0
Finland 3.6 .5 19.0 69.7
Spain 3.6 21.7 25.7 97.0
Algeria 3.7 –5.4 30.0 46.7
Austria 3.9 10.9 21.1 100.0
Malaysia 4.0 –6.3 29.2 7.7
Italy 4.0 4.9 17.5 100.0
Syria 4.1 22.6 50.1 90.6
Egypt 4.3 43.7 43.2 93.9
Portugal 4.5 25.5 29.3 100.0
Greece 4.6 38.9 26.3 100.0
Brazil 4.6 –8.2 29.2 51.5
Gabon 5.2 –31.2 31.7 0
Malta 5.4 32.8 37.9 100.0
Korea,
Republic of 5.6 2.3 30.8 84.4
Hong Kong 6.1 –.7 41.9 72.7
Japan 6.1 –9.8 31.6 39.4
Singapore 6.6 8.3 30.5 100.0
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exchange rate premia, in economic growth.11
We include a measure of capital controls in the
benchmark equation to account for any negative
growth effects due to the lack of capital mobility
across nations. Specifically, we do not want to
confuse the effects of low capital mobility with
the effects of a low trade imbalance. Low capital
mobility impedes the development of trade im-
balances and is likely to be related to low rates
of economic growth.
As model 2 shows, exchange controls de-
crease economic growth and the coefficient is
statistically significant and economically impor-
tant. Holding all else constant, the size of the
coefficient suggests that a black market pre-
mium of 50 percent, for example, would de-
crease a country’s average growth rate in the
range of 0.20 to 0.25 percentage points per year.
The effects of trade balances. Can trade
balances explain any variation in economic
growth once capital controls and the standard
determinants of growth are held constant?
Before we examine this question, we first pre-
sent some simple descriptive statistics on the
relationship between trade balances and eco-
nomic growth.
Table 3 summarizes the countries in the
data set and shows their average yearly growth
rate, the trade deficit as a share of total trade, the
share of total years in deficit, and a measure of
bilateral trade imbalances as a share of total
trade. The trade deficit as a share of total trade is
imports minus exports divided by total trade
(imports plus exports); the share of total years in
deficit is the number of years a country has had
a trade deficit over the 1960–89 period divided
by the number of years in the period (30);
bilateral trade imbalances are measured by sum-
ming a country’s bilateral trade deficits and sur-
pluses and dividing by that country’s total trade
and adjusting for overall surpluses and deficits.12
In other words, our measure of bilateral imbal-
ances represents the percentage of a country’s
trade that is bilaterally imbalanced (after adjust-
ments for total imbalances).
The countries in Table 3 are grouped ac-
cording to growth rates; the slowest 25 percent
of countries are in the upper left and the fastest
25 percent of countries are in the lower right.
Without controlling for the important determi-
nants of growth, there appears to be a weak
positive correlation between economic growth
and the percentage of years in deficit. The fast-
est growing countries seem to have more years
in deficit than the slower growing countries,
although those countries in the middle growth
range are not distinguishable as having a higher
or lower share of years in deficit. There is a nega-
tive correlation between bilateral imbalances
and economic growth. This correlation is stron-
ger than the previous one. The greater the bilat-
eral imbalance, the lower the growth; there is no
ambiguity in the middle growth categories. The
overall trade deficit as a share of total trade also
appears to be negatively related to growth,
although it is not a strong relationship. A priori,
it is difficult to see any strong relationship
between measures of overall or bilateral trade
imbalances and economic growth. However,
the other factors determining growth should be
taken into account before any conclusions can
be properly made.
Equation 3 in Table 2 adds the share of
years a country’s trade account is in deficit to
the benchmark model. As the results indicate,
the variable is positively related to economic
growth, but it is not statistically significant at
the standard 5-percent level. However, taking
the point estimate seriously, the size of the
coefficient suggests that its economic effects are
only moderate. For example, the United States,
with 69.7 percent of its years in deficit, would
experience an increase in its growth rate of
about 0.5 percentage points per year.
The weakness of the relationship between
trade balances and economic growth is shown
by an alternative measure of trade deficit: trade
deficit as a share of total trade, shown in equa-
tion 4 of Table 2. In this case, the coefficient is
negative but is extremely small and statistically
insignificant. Taking the point estimate seriously,
a trade deficit that is 12 percent of total trade,
which is what the United States had over the
period 1960–89, would only decrease average
yearly per capita real GDP growth by about 0.05
percentage points.
Equation 5 includes bilateral imbalances as
a share of trade. As the results indicate, the
coefficient on this variable is negative, but, with
a t value less than 1, it is not statistically signifi-
cant. Thus, empirical evidence is consistent with
the hypothesis that bilateral trade imbalances
have no particular impact on economic growth.
Conclusion
In this study, we have examined, both
theoretically and empirically, the relationship
between trade balances and long-run economic
growth. We find that trade imbalances have
little effect on rates of economic growth once
we account for the fundamental determinants
of economic growth.
For the most part, trade deficits or sur-
pluses are merely a reflection of a country’s18
international borrowing or lending profile over
time. Just as companies borrow to finance in-
vestment and purchases, so do countries. A
country can have a perpetual trade deficit or
surplus simply because income payments from
investments allow it to finance the country’s
desired flow of goods. Far too often, the com-
mon wisdom is that large trade deficits signal a
fundamentally weak economy, when the em-
pirical evidence suggests that there is no long-
run relationship between the two. Trade deficits
and surpluses are part of the efficient allocation
of economic resources and international risk-
sharing that is critical to the long-run health of
the world economy. Neither one, by itself, is a
better indicator of long-run economic growth
than the other.
Notes
1 Thomas Mun (1664) pointed out that “Our yearly con-
sumption of foreign wares to be for the value of twenty
thousand pounds, and our exportations to exceed that
two hundred thousand pounds, which sum wee have
therupon affirmed is brought to us in treasure to
ballance the accompt” [emphasis added]. Interna-
tional lending must have been relatively small in the
seventeenth century.
2 In the eighteenth century, precious metals were
referred to as “specie.”
3 In modern times, currency boards, such as those
found in Hong Kong and Argentina, use the U.S.
dollar to back their currency, and many other fixed-
exchange-rate regimes peg the value of their curren-
cies to the U.S. dollar.
4 See Schumpeter (1954, 344–45 and 356–57) for an
excellent discussion of mercantilistic thought.
5 For an example of this type of analysis, see Duchin and
Lange (1988). They argue that eliminating the trade
deficit in 1987 would have increased employment by
5.1 million jobs. This figure represented an increase of
about 5 percent in total employment from a trade
deficit that represented only about 3 percent of GDP.
6 See, for example, Krueger (1978); Bhagwati (1978);
World Bank (1987); De Long and Summers (1991);
Michaely, Papageorgiou, and Choksi (1991); Edwards
(1992); Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992); and Gould
and Ruffin (1995).
7 See, for example, Kormendi and Meguire (1985);
Barro (1991); Romer (1990); Levine and Renelt (1992);
Edwards (1992); Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992);
Backus, Kehoe, and Kehoe (1992); and Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil (1992). These empirical studies
typically rely on a closed-economy version of the
neoclassical Solow growth model. The closed-
economy model would seem inappropriate in a world
where capital is internationally mobile. However, an
implication of the open-economy neoclassical model
is that countries should experience rapid income con-
vergence because capital can move quickly across
borders and does not have to be slowly accumulated
at home. But fast income convergence is not borne out
by cross-country empirical evidence.
Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995) find that
the transition to the long run in an open-economy
neoclassical model may not be instantaneous if there
are some impediments to the flow of capital across
countries. Impediments to the flow of capital are likely,
especially when considering the flow of human capital
across nations.
8 The benchmark model utilizes a log-linear formulation
for two reasons: it has a basis in Cobb–Douglas pro-
duction technologies (such as Backus, Kehoe, and
Kehoe 1992 and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992), and
this model is superior to a simple linear formulation in
minimizing the mean squared error.
9 Least squares estimates are used because they are
less sensitive to the end points of the growth period.
10 Although regressing average growth rates against
initial income levels suggests income convergence,
it does not necessarily provide statistical evidence of
convergence. Quah (1990) and Friedman (1992) note
that, because of regression to the mean, a negative
relationship between average growth rate and initial
income does not necessarily provide statistical
evidence of convergence.
11 The black market exchange rate premium is the
percentage by which the official exchange rate
deviates from the market exchange rate and is often a
good proxy for the degree to which countries attempt
to control international capital flows.























1 where Xi is total
exports of country i, Mi is total imports of country i, Xij
is exports of country i to country j, and Mij is imports to
country i from country j.
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Appendix
A Simple Dynamic Model of Growth, the Balance of Trade,
And International Capital Movements
It is not obvious that a long-term creditor
country must have a trade deficit, or that a long-
term debtor country must have a trade surplus. In
other words, why should it be that net investment
income necessarily exceeds net capital outflows
for a long-term creditor country, or that net debt
payments must necessarily exceed net capital
inflows for a long-term debtor country? To demon-
strate this claim, we consider a world consisting of
two countries—home and foreign. For the sake of
simplicity, both countries produce a single, identi-
cal good that can be either consumed or used as
capital.1 Moreover, to keep the notation simple, we
assume both countries have the same population
and that there is no depreciation of capital (capital
lasts forever or is used up in consumption). To
keep one country from overrunning the other, we
suppose the labor forces grow at the same rate.
Finally, we suppose that the single good is pro-
duced under constant returns to scale by only two
factors, labor and capital.
Let k and k* denote the owned capital per
unit of labor in the home and foreign countries,
respectively. Capital movements take place by
the home country’s borrowing B units of capital
from the foreign country, so the capital per unit
labor located in the home country is k + b, where
b = B/L, while the capital per unit labor located in
the foreign country is k* – b. If capital is freely
mobile, the equilibrium per capita stock of foreign
investment, b, is determined by equating the
marginal products of capital in both countries—
that is,
(A.1) f′(k + b) = g′(k* – b) = r,
where f and g denote the per capita production
functions in the home and foreign countries,
respectively, and f′ and g′ denote the derivatives
or the marginal products of capital.
Let s and s* denote the constant saving
rates in the home and foreign countries, and let n
denote the rate of growth of the labor force in both
countries. Per capita incomes are f(k + b) – rb in
the home country and g(k* – b) + rb in the foreign
country. According to the Solow growth model
(Solow 1956), the countries will be in steady-state
when savings equal required investment:
(A.2) s[f(k + b) – rb] – nk = 0,
and
(A.3) s*[g(k* – b) + rb] + nk* = 0.
Solving equations A.1–A.3 yields steady-state
values of k, k*, and b.2 Thus, in the long run,
db/dt = 0.
In the short run, db/dt may be nonzero. Let
us look at the short-run and long-run dynamics of
the balance of payments as envisioned by Cairnes
(1874). Since b = B/L, the rate of change in the per
capita stock of foreign investment is
(A.4) db/dt = (dB/dt )/L – nb,
where n = (dL/dt)/L and (dB/dt)/L is the per capita
inflow of capital to the home country from the
foreign country. Equation A.3 may be used to
describe the determinants of the per capita trade
balance. By definition, the per capita trade surplus,
x – m (exports minus imports), will be per capita
foreign debt service, rb, where r is the rate of
interest [r = f′(k + b)] – per capita capital inflows.
In other words,
(A.5) x – m = rb – (dB/dt)/L.
Combining equations A.4 and A.5 results in
(A.6) x – m = (r – n)b – db/dt.
This is our key equation. The home country’s per
capita trade balance equals (r – n)b minus the
change in its per capita net indebtedness. In the
steady-state, db/dt = 0, the per capita trade sur-
plus (x – m ) = (r – n)b. Assuming r > n, if the home
country is a net debtor, b > 0, there will be a sur-
plus. In contrast, if b < 0, the country will have a
long-run deficit. Cairnes claimed that the net
creditor’s long-run trade balance would be nega-
tive, implying that r > n in the long run. Remark-
ably, the condition that r > n is the condition for
dynamic economic efficiency (Phelps 1966).
In the above model, the long-run growth
rate is simply equal to the population growth rate.
This follows because in the steady-state, b, k, and
k* are constant; accordingly, per capita income
remains constant. If we reinterpreted the model
in terms of the effective labor supply and labor-
augmenting technological progress, per capita
income would increase by the rate of technological
progress. Whatever interpretation is made, the
model is then so constructed that both countries
grow at exactly the same rate.
A key conclusion from this analysis is that
in the long run, there should be no link between
economic growth and the trade balance. The long-
run trade balance is determined by the net creditor
or debtor status of the country, while the long-run
growth rate is determined by the growth rate of the
population and technological progress.
1 This model is based on Ruffin (1979).
2 Ruffin (1979) demonstrates the conditions under which the above
model has a unique solution.